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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
Nos. 17-1985 & 17-1986
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
LIONEL CANNON,
a/k/a Cannon
Lionel Cannon,
Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Nos. 2-14-cr-00213-001 &
2-15-cr-00038-001)
District Judge: Honorable Mark R. Hornak
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
January 22, 2018
Before: HARDIMAN, VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: February 13, 2018)
____________
OPINION*
____________

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does
not constitute binding precedent.

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Lionel Cannon appeals an order of the District Court denying his motion to
suppress wiretap evidence of his participation in a drug-trafficking conspiracy. We will
affirm.
I
This case arises out of an investigation into members of the Crips street gang in
the Homewood neighborhood of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. In 2013, two confidential
sources told authorities that a man named “Cecil Penex” or “Cecil Pentex” was selling
large quantities of cocaine in Pittsburgh. A multi-agency Task Force subsequently began
investigating the drug-trafficking activities of various Crips. Between December 2013
and March 2014, the Task Force sought and obtained three warrants to wiretap a variety
of target telephones believed to be affiliated with the conspiracy. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(3).
In May 2014, the Task Force obtained a fourth warrant (Wiretap C). Among other
things, Wiretap C authorized the wiretap of Target Telephone 11 (TT11), which belonged
to Cecil Pinnix. Wiretap C also identified Cannon as a “Target Subject and/or
Interceptee” over TT11. App. 1435. In support of this classification, the affidavit
referenced information provided by Confidential Source 8 (CS-8), who provided an
address and phone number used by Cannon and stated that Cannon used a white
Chevrolet Malibu to transport large quantities of cocaine from Cleveland, Ohio to
Pittsburgh.
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The following month, the Task Force obtained a fifth warrant (Wiretap D), which
authorized the interception of Cannon’s communications over two of his cell phones
(TT14 and TT15). The affidavit averred that intercepted communications from TT11,
pen-register and toll-record data, physical surveillance, and GPS data all corroborated the
information previously provided by CS-8. In addition, CS-8 stated that Cannon mailed
proceeds from drug-trafficking activity to a man in California named Jason Hunter, and
provided authorities with what CS-8 claimed was Hunter’s number. Pen-register data
evidenced communications between Cannon and a number subscribed to Hunter, which
the Task Force interpreted as further corroborating CS-8’s statements. Finally, the Task
Force obtained a sixth warrant (Wiretap E) for a third phone used by Cannon (TT16),
supported in large part by communications intercepted under Wiretap D.
As a result of the investigation, Cannon was indicted for, among other things,
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. Cannon moved to suppress all evidence obtained
from Wiretaps C, D, and E, claiming the affidavits lacked probable cause and did not
contain the required showing of necessity. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). Cannon also
requested a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), arguing that the
District Court should excise allegedly false statements from the affidavits. After oral
argument and the submission of additional briefs, the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania denied Cannon’s motion in all respects. Cannon entered a
conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the District Court’s order. This
appeal followed.
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II1
On appeal, Cannon again contends that the affidavits lacked probable cause and
the wiretaps were not necessary to the investigation. He does so, however, without telling
us how or where the District Court’s analysis went astray. Counsel has neither argued
that specific factual findings were clearly erroneous nor addressed the merits and analysis
of the District Court’s opinion in any meaningful way. Instead, Cannon’s brief
reproduces almost verbatim what he filed in opposition to the Government’s motion to
dismiss. Compare Cannon Br. 38–51, with App. 977–91 (Wiretap D and E’s probable
cause); Cannon Br. 56–61, with App. 991–995 (affidavits’ lack of necessity); Cannon Br.
33–36, with App. 971–74 (Wiretap C’s probable cause and CS-8’s reliability); compare
also Cannon Br. 24–32, with App. 957–65 (legal standards for probable cause, including
those governing a Franks hearing, the denial of which was not challenged on appeal);
Cannon Br. 51–56, with App. 965–69 (legal standards governing necessity).
As a consequence, Cannon’s 37-page argument nowhere cites the District Court
decision and provides only two citations to the appendix. See Cannon Br. 24–61.
Submitting a brief so devoid of record citations in support of legal arguments in such a
fact-bound case is inconsistent with Rule 28(a)(8)(A) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, as well as Rule 28.3(c) of the Third Circuit’s Local Appellate Rules.
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The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review the denial of a suppression motion for clear error as
to the underlying facts, but exercise plenary review as to its legality in light of the court’s
properly found facts.” United States v. Agnew, 407 F.3d 193, 196 (3d Cir. 2005).
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This is not appropriate appellate advocacy. Counsel for appellants “must of
necessity” identify in the record where the trial court erred in finding the facts or in
applying the law to the facts. Kushner v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 620 F.2d 404, 407
(3d Cir. 1980). This duty flows from the fact that we are not a court of first impression,
and—especially where factual findings are involved—we do not write on a blank slate.
Our task is to decide whether the findings already made by the District Court were clearly
erroneous and whether it applied the correct legal standards. By simply reproducing his
District Court brief, Cannon’s counsel has failed to assist us in discharging our duty.
Nevertheless, we have performed an independent review of the record and the
decision of the District Court. And that review has led us to conclude that the District
Court did not err when it held that the affidavits were supported by probable cause and
the wiretaps were necessary to the investigation. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in
the District Court’s well-crafted opinion, we will affirm its order denying Cannon’s
motion to suppress.
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